Introduction
Forecasts of goal variables such as output and ination play an important role in the policy process of many central banks. A common rationale for the use of forecasts in decisions about interest rates is that monetary policy aects those goal variables only with substantial lags. Absent some intermediate target variable which would largely capture the eect of the current stance of monetary policy on the future values of those goal variables, it might seem optimal for the central bank to set its instrument such that the forecast of the goal variables conditional on current information and the current interest rate coincides with one's targets for the goal variables.
A second rationale for the use of forecasts in monetary policy decisions has been suggested by the experience of countries that use ination targets as monetary policy strategy. In ination-targeting countries, the central bank is charged with achieving and maintaining a specic level of ination in some price index. There is no equivalent numerical goal for output that monetary policy should achieve. It has been argued that, if the central bank would attempt to maintain ination period by period at exactly the target, the instrument movements necessary for doing so would induce a large amount of undesirable volatility in output. Goodhart (1998) suggests that, by adjusting the instrument such as to stabilize the forecast of ination at some appropriate horizon around the target level, the central bank can largely succeed in stabilizing actual ination, while avoiding destabilizing eects on output.
Recently, the concept of \forecast targeting" has received considerable attention both in theoretical and empirical work (Svensson 1997 , Batini and Haldane 1999 , Batini and Nelson 1999 ). These authors model forecast targeting as a regime in which the central bank is charged with stabilizing its own forecast of some variable, typically ination, at some horizon around a target value. 1 The implication of such a procedure is that the central bank does not attempt to oset either current uctuations in its goal variable, or uctuations that are expected to occur prior to its chosen forecast horizon. In models that are not formulated in terms of individual optimizing behaviour, Svensson shows that optimal policy implies forecast targeting, while Batini and Haldane and Batini and Nelson show that such use of forecasts has desirable properties according to some ad hoc criterion.
However, this view of the appropriate use of forecasts in setting monetary policy, while intuitively appealing, may be misleading. As Lucas (1976) pointed out, due to the forwardlooking nature of private sector behaviour, changes in the rule under which monetary policy operates may cause changes in private sector responses. Hence, the lags with which monetary policy aects the goal variables may depend on private sector expectations about how monetary policy operates, and in this sense be largely endogenous. In this paper, we study the consequences of using forecasts as a guide for monetary policy within a framework which places great emphasis on the forward-looking behaviour of private agents. Similar to the literature cited above, forecast-based monetary policy is modelled as a regime in which the central bank is charged with setting policy such that the deviation of the forecast of a specic variable at a specic horizon from some target value is minimized. We are particularly interested in the question whether certain features of the economy imply welfare benets resulting from the use of forecasts in the decision-making process of the central bank.
Because our model is based on optimizing behaviour of households, the representative household's welfare provides a natural benchmark for the evaluation of alternative objectives delegated to the central bank. In contrast to the literature on optimal delegation, beginning with Rogo (1985) , the reason for delegating an objective dierent than the representative household's welfare to the central bank is not an assumed inability of the central bank to act under commitment. We assume that the central bank is able to commit itself to setting policy such as to achieve the objective delegated to it. Instead, our analysis is motivated by the observation that in practice the objectives delegated to central banks are not necessarily reecting some judgment about the preferences of society. For example, as mentioned earlier, in ination targeting countries there exists no target for output equivalent to the target for ination delegated to the central bank. Yet, this does not imply that in these countries monetary policy is oblivious to the output consequences of its decisions. A possible rationale for such delegation might be that delegation of a more complex objective, for example one involving some denition of the output gap, leads to problems in holding the central bank accountable for its performance, if only because the output gap is measured with great uncertainty. Delegating an objective dened in terms of ination only, but in such a way as to prevent undesirable output variability, may then be attractive.
To analyze the welfare properties of various objectives for monetary policy, we use a model in which households maximize their utility by choosing consumption and setting wages in a staggered fashion, and rms engage in staggered price setting for their products. In previous work (Amato and Laubach 1999a), we analyzed the welfare properties of forecast-based monetary policy in a model with imperfect competition and staggered price setting in goods markets, but perfectly competitive labour markets. Extending the analysis to a model with imperfectly competitive goods and labour markets is interesting for several reasons. First, evidence on staggered wage setting is certainly at least as persuasive as evidence on staggered price setting. Furthermore, as demonstrated in Erceg (1997) , staggered wage setting generates a at marginal cost schedule at the individual rm level, and hence persistent output eects of monetary shocks, without assumptions on the elasticity of labour supply that are in conict with evidence from micro data.
More directly related to the questions raised above, Erceg et al. (1999) show that the model with staggered price and wage setting generates a tradeo between the variability of price ination, wage ination, and the output gap. If there is more than one source of nominal rigidity in the economy, stabilizing the price level does not imply stabilizing output around the Pareto-optimal level that would obtain in the exible price and wage case. This is in contrast to the results of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) , who show that in a model with only one nominal rigidity, complete output gap and ination stabilization is feasible, and hence no output-ination variability tradeo exists. A model with staggered price and wage setting, therefore, provides a framework in which the validity of Goodhart's suggestion mentioned earlier can be assessed.
Because we wish to evaluate economic performance under alternative policy rules, not only is it important to spell out the model in terms of individual optimizing behaviour for the reasons pointed out by Lucas (1976) , but the model should also perform well in explaining the historical data. To this end, in Amato and Laubach (1999b) we estimate the model with sticky prices and wages using methods developed in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) . Estimation permits a rigorous evaluation of the model's empirical performance. The estimated model is used for performing the simulations reported in this study. The estimation method and results are contained in the companion paper, and accordingly the discussion of estimation issues below is brief.
Our ndings are twofold. First, a policy that aims solely at stabilizing price ination comes fairly close in terms of welfare to the welfare-optimal policy. In this case, monetary policy should aim at stabilizing only uctuations in ination that are forecastable two years ahead, as opposed to stabilizing all uctuations. A policy that stabilizes the conditional expectation of ination two years ahead around target reduces welfare losses compared to a policy that aims at stabilizing current ination, or ination four years ahead. The higher unconditional variance of ination under a policy that stabilizes expected ination two years ahead, compared to a policy of current ination stabilization, is more than oset by a reduction in the variance of wage ination. Second, however, a policy aimed at stabilizing all uctuations, not just forecastable ones, in both price and wage ination dominates a policy of stabilizing just price ination. Stabilizing merely uctuations in price and wage ination that are forecastable at some horizon results in sizeable welfare losses. Hence, if an objective in terms of more than one variable is to be delegated to the central bank, stabilizing forecasts is inferior to stabilizing all uctuations of those variables. This second result is reminiscent of Friedman's (1975) insight, in that monetary policy is best conducted under an objective which resembles the household's welfare as closely as possible.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present the model and briey discuss estimation. In section 3 we present the objective that characterizes individual welfare, and introduce the forecast-based objectives. Finally, we compare economic performance under the dierent interest-rate policies that are optimal for the various objectives. Section 4 concludes. The welfare objective is derived in an Appendix.
An Estimated Model for Policy Evaluation
In this section we introduce a structural model of price ination, wage ination and output determination similar to the model developed in Erceg et al. (1999) . As mentioned earlier, real eects of monetary policy in this model are due to imperfect competition and staggered price and wage setting in goods and labour markets. Following the description of the model, we briey discuss estimation of the structural parameters of this model.
2.1
The Structural Model
The economy consists of a continuum of households and rms, and there is a continuum of dierentiated, perishable goods and dierentiated kinds of labour services. Each household is the monopolistic supplier of one kind of labour service, and consumes a CES aggregate of all the dierentiated goods. The household sets a nominal wage for its labour services, and supplies as many hours as are demanded at its chosen wage. Each rm is the monopolistic producer for one good, and uses a CES aggregate of households' labour services in the production process. The rm sets a price for its good, and satises demand at this price. Because the analysis focusses on the eects of monetary policy at the business cycle horizon, capital accumulation is not modelled. Household i's utility is dened over the index C i t , where
z denotes a specic good, and > 1 parameterizes the elasticity of substitution in the household's preferences between the various goods. As gets large, goods become ever closer substitutes, whereas if approaches 1 from above, goods are less and less substitutable. Hence also measures the market power of each of the rms located on the interval [0,1], with market power decreasing in . The \consumption-based price index" is dened as
The price index P t denotes the minimum amount the household has to spend to obtain one unit of the composite good C t dened as in (1) . Maximizing the index (1) for a given level of consumption expenditure, the household allocates consumption across individual products according to
Household i is the sole supplier of labour services h i , and its objective is to maximize 
Within each period, the household derives utility u(1; t ) from consumption C i t as dened in (1), while supplying hours h i t reduces utility, as indicated by the function v(1; t ). In the budget constraint, P t denotes the price index dened in (2) , and A t denotes the nominal value of the household's holdings of nancial assets at the beginning of period t. W i t is the hourly wage that household i charges, and 5 t the household's share in rms' prots, which we assume are distributed lump-sum to households. t; is a stochastic discount factor, pricing in period t assets whose payos are in period . Financial markets are assumed to be complete, and in particular there exists a riskless one-period nominal bond, the gross return on which is given by R t (E t t;t+1 ) 01 . The stochastic disturbance t is interpreted as preference or \demand" shock, while t is a disturbance to labour supply. The household's choice variables are consumption and hours or, given the demand function for its labour services, its wage.
Firm z is the monopolistic supplier of good z, which it produces according to the production function y t (z) = e t K a H t (z) 10a (6) where t denotes a stochastic technology disturbance, the capital stock employed by each rm is xed at K, and the rm's labour input is a CES aggregate of dierent households' labour services
The parameter > 1 characterizes the elasticity of substitution between the various types of labour services. The wage index W t is dened as 
Maximizing the index (7) for a given level of wage payments, rm z allocates demand for individual labour services according to
Aggregate demand for output is dened as Y t = C t + G t , where C t R 1 0 C i t di, and G t is an exogenously given component of demand for output, which is assumed to be determined one period ahead. Assuming that G t is allocated across the dierent goods by maximizing an index dened analogous to the consumption index (1), the demand faced by rm z is given by y t (z) = p t (z)
Analogously, by integrating (9) across rms, the demand for its labour services faced by household i is
where H t R 1 0 H t (z)dz. We now characterize households' utility-maximizing consumption and wage decisions, and rms' prot-maximizing price choices. Because we wish to use solution methods for linear rational expectations models, the equilibrium conditions we use are log-linear approximations to the exact, nonlinear rst order conditions of households and rms. For reasons discussed in Woodford (1999a) the welfare analysis later on is facilitated by log-linearizing around the ecient steady state, i.e. the steady state corresponding to a situation without market power and nominal rigidities in goods and labour markets. The ecient steady state level of output is determined by the condition that households' marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption equal marginal product of labour, i.e.
where Y and G denote the steady state values of output and exogenous demand respectively. The presence of market power of households and rms implies that, absent some osetting policy, the steady state output level is below this ecient level of output. To justify loglinearizing the exact equilibrium conditions around the ecient steady state, below we will have to assume that tax policies are in place which oset the ineciencies caused by imperfect competition in goods and labour markets. Furthermore, we log-linearize around a steady state in which there is zero price and wage ination.
Households are assumed to choose their consumption purchases two periods ahead, i.e. (13) 2 Although this choice of decision lag is somewhat arbitrary, it is no more arbitrary than choosing to specify our model at a quarterly frequency -or, for that matter, any frequency -in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary. As in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), we choose a two quarter lag to match the timing of the maximum impact of a monetary policy shock on output in our model to that in the VAR. Instead, we could introduce and estimate a free parameter that captures the average decision lag of households due to, e.g., time-to-build constraints.
where i t denotes household i's marginal utility of income at date t. Since households are free to take investment decisions each period with immediate eect, t has to satisfy
whereR t is the percentage deviation of the interest rate from its steady state value consistent with zero ination. The log-linear approximation of the Euler equation (13) is therefore
whereĈ t (C t 0 C)= C denotes the percentage deviation of consumption from its steady state value C, 0u cc ( C) C=u c ( C), and t 0(u c ( C)=u cc ( C) C) t is the disturbance to the marginal utility of consumption.
Log-linearizing aggregate demand around the steady state yieldŝ households is chosen at random and independent of their individual histories, and is being oered the opportunity to set a new wage. Hence, from the perspective of an individual household, the wage set in period t applies with probability 1 in period t, with probability it applies in period t + 1, with probability 2 in period t + 2 and so forth. Rotemberg 
Firms set the price in period t 0 1 such that the price, adjusted for the subsidy, equals a weighted average of expected future marginal cost at the level of output demanded at price p 1 t , times a markup 01 . A log-linear approximation to this rst-order condition is derived in the Appendix.
Using this log-linear approximation as well as the corresponding relation for p 2 t and the log-linear approximation of the price index (25), the law of motion for the rate of price ination t log(P t =P t01 ) is given by The simulations of alternative policy rules that we perform in the next section require us to specify stochastic processes for the shocks and provide values of the model parameters.
To obtain estimates of the shocks and model parameters, we adopt the approach taken by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) , which is extended to the model considered here in Amato and Laubach (1999b) . We briey describe this approach to estimation; see Amato and Laubach (1999b) for further details. Our data set is for the U.S., and is comprised of quarterly observations on real (chainweighted) GDP, the GDP deator, compensation per hour in the nonfarm business sector, and the federal funds rate, from 1980:1 to 1997:3. 3;4 We are presenting our empirical results in terms of the real wage instead of wage ination because we nd impulse responses of the real wage more convenient to interpret, and because in other work the eects of monetary policy on wages is measured as eects on real wages, not wage ination. Given our denition of variables in the previous subsection, the two are linked by w t =ŵ t 0ŵ t01 + t . To express the data conformable with the theoretical series fŶ t ; t ;ŵ t ;R t g of the model, the data on real GDP data are logarithmized and a linear trend is removed, ination is computed as log rst dierences of the GDP deator, the real wage is computed as the logarithm of compensation per hour deated by the GDP deator and a linear trend is removed, and the federal funds rate is expressed at quarterly rate. Let fy t ; t ; w t ; r t g denote these series, which are conformable with their theoretical counterparts up to a constant.
The estimation process has three steps. The rst step is to construct and estimate a vector autoregression (VAR) for the model's four endogenous variables. The theoretical model implies that, because they are predetermined, output, ination, and the real wage are not contemporaneously aected by an interest rate innovation, while the form of the interest rate rule (30) allows for contemporaneous feedback from output, ination, and the real wage to the interest rate. This is sucient to identify the parameters of the historical interest rate rule and the series of interest rate innovations f t g. Let Z t = (r t ; w t+1 ; t+1 ; y t+1 ) 0 , and let Z t = (Z 0 t ; Z 0 t01 ; Z 0 t02 ) 0 . The reason for dening Z t in this manner is that the elements of Z t all belong to the period t information set, since output, ination, and the real wage are predetermined. The structural form of a VAR(3) in Z t can then be written as
where T is an identity matrix with a lower triangular 4 by 4 submatrix in the upper left corner, the rst four rows of A contain coecients, and the last eight rows of the VAR are identities. Accordingly, the last eight elements of e t are zeros. The rst four elements are mutually orthogonal, so that the rst four diagonal elements of the covariance matrix V of e t are distinct from zero, and all remaining elements of V are zero. Under our identifying assumption, the rst row of A contains the coecients of the historical interest rate rule (30), and the rst element of e t is t . 5 The second step is to choose the model parameters (; ; !; a;; ; p ; ; ; w ) based on 5 As pointed out above, the series fy t ; t ; w t ; r t g are conformable with their theoretical counterparts up to constants. By including the constant m in the VAR, the coecients in the rst row of A can be interpreted as the coecients in (30). ; ; and w , since they appear in the model only through w and w in the wage ination equation (23). Based on several survey studies, we follow Rotemberg and Woodford by setting 0:66, which implies that prices remain unchanged on average for three quarters. Similarly, we impose 0:66. Finally, as discussed in Amato and Laubach (1999b), although p ; w ; and ! are each identied (given values for and ), the ratio w = p and ! are not separately well-determined from the data. We therefore set w p , which has the interpretation of imposing equal measures of exogenous rigidity in prices and wages (under the assumption ). Given these values, the remaining parameters ; !; p ; p ; and w are estimated by minimizing the squared dierences between the model's and the VAR's responses during quarters 1 to 5 following a monetary policy shock in quarter 0.
The estimates, or implied values, for the parameters ; !; p ; ; p ; w ; ; and w are displayed in Table 1 . The estimate of implies an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption of 3.9. This is larger than what has been found in the non-durable consumption literature and what is typically assumed in the real-business cycle literature (e.g. values between one and two), but it is smaller than Rotemberg and Woodford's estimate of 6.25.
However, since the variable C in our model -as in Rotemberg and Woodford's -proxies for all interest-rate sensitive components of output, and not just non-durable consumption, a value higher than two appears justied. The estimate of ! implies an elasticity of labour supply of 5.0, which is about half the size of Rotemberg and Woodford's estimate. 6 The plausibility of our estimate is dicult to determine from the micro panel data literature, since the functional forms used in that literature are based on rst-order conditions derived in a setting with exible wages. Nonetheless, using panel data results as a guide, an estimate of ve is larger than what is typically found, but not implausibly so. The estimate of p implies a steady-state markup of prices over marginal cost of 19%, which is quite similar to Rotemberg and Woodford's value of 15%. Finally, the estimate of w implies a steady-state markup of the real wage over the marginal rate of substitution of 13%, which, as with our estimate of the steady-state price markup, is neither so low nor so high to be regarded as implausible. Figure 1 presents the impulse responses of the four endogenous variables to a monetary policy shock. The solid lines are the model's predictions given our parameter estimates, and the dashed lines are the responses estimated from the VAR. Overall, over the rst ve quarters after the shock, the responses of the model closely match those of the VAR. The main discrepancies are in the ination and real wage responses, primarily from the fact that the model cannot replicate, for any parameter values, the hump in ination three to four quarters after the shock and the hump in the real wage two quarters after the shock.
Given the estimates of the VAR and the structural parameters, the third estimation step is to choose the shock processes so that the model responses of output, ination, and the real wage to innovations in the structural shocks match exactly the responses of those variables in the VAR to the three remaining VAR disturbances.
Alternative Objectives for Monetary Policy
The goal of this section is to characterize the behaviour of the economy under various objectives for monetary policy, and to evaluate the desirability of these objectives in terms of their welfare properties. The previous section emphasized the fact that deriving a structural model from individual optimizing behaviour has the advantage that the coecients in the resulting model equations have a structural interpretation and, if the model is correctly specied, should remain invariant under alternative policies. A second advantage of an optimization-based model, which is exploited in this section, is the ability to perform welfare comparisons between alternative policy rules, in that the representative household's lifetime utility provides a model-consistent evaluation criterion.
The section starts by providing an approximation to the lifetime utility of the representative household, expressed in terms of a weighted sum of the variances of the endogenous variables. This approximation facilitates the evaluation of the welfare consequences of alternative policies. The second subsection presents what we call \forecast-based objectives" for monetary policy. The purpose is to formalize the notion that the central bank chooses its instrument at any point in time such that the forecast s periods ahead of some variable is equal to some target for this variable. As argued in the Introduction, such objectives provide a plausible description of the way in which many central banks decide about instrument settings. It appears therefore of interest to evaluate the welfare properties of such objectives, and in particular the importance of the \policy horizon" s.
As mentioned in the previous section, given an objective for monetary policy, there are two alternative formulations of the policy-makers' problem. First, one can solve for the plan, i.e. the path for the endogenous variables, that is optimal under the specied objective by maximizing the objective subject to the constraint that the structural equations (the IS, wage ination, and price ination equations) hold at all points in time. This approach does not involve specifying a particular functional form for the interest rate rule. Second, one can posit some specic functional form of an interest rate rule, and then choose the parameters of this rule to maximize the objective. This approach is particularly interesting in light of the results of Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) who show that, in the context of their model, the optimal rule within quite simple classes of interest rate rules comes close to achieving the welfare level obtained under the optimal plan. It has been argued that such simple rules are attractive because they enhance the transparency of monetary policy. Our results using this approach are presented in the third subsection. The criterion for evaluating alternative policies is the representative household's welfare, which can be expressed as
This objective is a simple transformation of the unconditional expectation of the household's lifetime utility (4) , where the expectation is taken over all possible histories prior to date zero. Due to the assumption of perfect insurance among households, consumption is identical across households, and hence the rst term inside brackets in (32) does not have a household index attached. The second term in brackets is understood as an average over possible histories of households' opportunity to change their wages.
In the Appendix we derive a second-order Taylor approximation of (32) around the same steady state considered in the log-linear approximations in section 2. This secondorder approximation has the advantage that it can be evaluated in terms of the log-linear approximations to the model's exact equilibrium conditions derived in section 2. Specically, the approximation can be expressed as 7 All simulations are performed under the assumption that the central bank is able to commit itself to a certain interest-rate policy, i.e. policies are not constrained to being time-consistent. is the Pareto-ecient level of output, expressed as percent deviation from Y , that would obtain under completely exible prices and wages. In transforming (33) to (34) we made use of the fact that, because the real wage is assumed stationary, E( w t ) has to equal E( t ). 8 The form of this loss function is similar to those assumed ad hoc in many studies of monetary policy design, and similar to the concern for output and ination variability expressed e.g. in Taylor (1979) . The coecients c 1 and c 2 express the weights of output gap and wage ination variability relative to price ination variability in (35). For our parameter estimates, c 1 = :007 and c 2 = :89. The small value of c 1 implies that avoiding output variability caused by uctuations in the ecient level of output is mostly undesirable, because it entails comparatively large welfare losses due to dispersion of relative prices and wages.
The presence of the rst moment 2 in (34) is due to the fact that even a constant, perfectly anticipated rate of ination dierent from zero forces households and rms to adjust their wages and prices whenever they have the opportunity to do so. The implied dispersion of relative prices is welfare reducing because at any point in time the condition that the real wage equal the marginal rate of substitution is violated for most households, and likewise the condition that price equal marginal cost is violated for most rms. The rst moment term is important once it is taken into account that nominal interest rates cannot fall below zero in an economy where non-interest-bearing money is held. Suppose a given interest rate policy implies an unconditional standard deviation (R) for the nominal interest rate, and that under such a policy all realizations of the interest rate are conned to an interval of size k(R) on each side of the steady state value R. For the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates to hold at all times, R k(R) has to hold. Since R = + , i.e. the steady state nominal interest rate equals the steady state ination rate plus the steady state real interest rate, we have that k(R) 0. This last inequality shows that a more volatile interest rate policy can only be implemented at the cost of a higher steady state ination rate, which reduces welfare. In the results reported below, we take this constraint into account by minimizing the objective
The values of k and are set to 2.46 and 3.04% respectively, which have been obtained 8 Because the second-order approximation (34) is taken around a steady state of zero wage and price ination, the term 2 has to be small for the approximation to remain valid.
from the estimated VAR.
Forecast-Based Objectives
As discussed in the Introduction, the rationale for having policy decisions depend explicitly on forecasts may be sought either in the dynamic response of goal variables to interest rate changes, or in the argument that by stabilizing forecasts for a subset of goal variables, the outcome may resemble the one in which policy aims at stabilizing the realized values of all goal variables. To formalize the use of forecasts in policy decisions, we assume that the objective delegated to the central bank can be described by x t+s denotes the average of variable x between periods t + s 1 and t + s 2 . This loss function penalizes deviations of forecasts, i.e. conditional expectations, of goal variables from target. The outer (unconditional) expectation makes the optimal path of interest rates (e.g. the interest rate rule) independent of the state of the economy when it is chosen. It is instructive to rewrite the objective (38) as For the special case of (39) with s 1 = s 2 = 0, the central bank is charged with minimizing some combination of the unconditional variances of the goal variables. It is important to note, however, that the case with the additional assumption 2 = 0 does not correspond to the case most commonly considered in the literature because the measure of the output gap in (39) has a dierent interpretation from what most authors use. This point is emphasized by both Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Erceg et al. (1999) . 9 By increasing s 1 and s 2 , the central bank is instructed to stabilize only the component of uctuations in the goal variables that is forecastable at a particular horizon. In respect of the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates, we append (39) to penalize excessive variation in R t (as in the 9 In fact, what most authors use as an output gap in their central bank objective, e.g. Taylor (1993) , is exactly our variableŶ , the deviation of log output from its steady state. In our empirical work, we measure the steady state output level using a linear trend estimated over our sample. See Amato and Laubach (1999b) Inspection of the welfare loss (35) associated with variability of the output gap and wage and price ination suggests that stabilizing merely some forecastable component of uctuations in the goal variables is not welfare improving. Not only are all uctuations in all three endogenous variables welfare-reducing, uctuations in wage and price ination that are unforecastable two periods ahead are particularly undesirable, as they cause additional distortions due to the particular specication of price setting considered in the model. Hence, the rationale that, due to lags in the transmission mechanism, monetary policy should aim at stabilizing forecasts instead of actual values of goal variables is certainly not an implication of our model. This holds despite the fact that in our model monetary policy does have lagged eects on all the endogenous variables, as Figure 1 demonstrates.
Suppose, however, that monetary policy is directed at stabilizing only a subset of the variables entering the welfare objective (37), i.e. that in (40) either 1 or 2 or both equal 0. In that particular case, stabilizing some forecastable component of the variable(s) entering (40) may lead to welfare improvements, as measured by the objective (37), compared to stabilizing all uctuations in that subset of variables. The case of 1 = 2 = 0, combined with an appropriate horizon, may for instance be viewed as a reasonable description of ination targeting, as suggested by Goodhart (1998) . Delegation of such a restricted objective may be sensible since the delegation of a less restricted objective involves specifying values for 1 and 2 . It is now widely accepted that ination stabilization should be a goal of monetary policy, whereas, apart from the guidance provided by the welfare objective (37), it is less clear how values for 1 and 2 would be determined in the political process. In the next subsection, we report results for the cases in which either 1 , or 2 , or both are set to 0.
Before doing so, it may be instructive to contrast our interpretation of forecast-based monetary policy with other representations in the literature. For instance, Batini and Haldane (1999) propose an interpretation of forward-looking monetary policy based on a specic form of interest-rate rule: Rules of this form are optimal in the class of unrestricted rules only if the s-period-ahead forecast of quarterly ination is the best linear combination of the state variables, which is generally unlikely to be the case. 10 A more serious problem with such a prescription for policy is that, without assuming a substantial degree of backward-looking dynamics in the structural equations (such as in Batini and Haldane's model), such a rule leads to indeterminacy of rational expectations equilibrium for large ranges of coecients in (41).
Results for Simple Rules
Interest-rate rules that implement the optimal plan for some given objective are generally very complicated. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) show that, for their model, rules conned to a few terms closely approximate the welfare achieved by unrestricted optimal plans. Also, because simple rules are more transparent, they are more likely to be inferred by private agents, thereby increasing the chance that a committed policy will reap its benets. Table 2 we report results for the case in which 1 = 2 = 0, while in Table 3 we consider results when either 1 or 2 is dierent from 0. For comparison, the nal two columns of Table 2 present results under the rule that minimizes the welfare criterion (37), and under the historical rule estimated in the VAR. For each dierent objective, the table rst presents the resulting coecients for the interest-rate rule, followed by the unconditional variances of the model's endogenous variables, the level of steady-state ination necessary to avoid the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates to be binding, and nally the value of the term inside brackets of the welfare criterion (37). The variances of wage and price ination and the interest rate are The size of the coecients in the various interest-rate rules, in particular that of a and c, is dicult to interpret, as neither the real wage nor output enters any of the objectives directly, but wage ination and the output gap instead. The response to current ination is strong, that to current output weak and in some cases negative, under all the rules. Most striking, however, is the size of the coecient on the lagged interest rate. Woodford (1999b) provides a rationale for such inertial behaviour of monetary policy by arguing that in the presence of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and welfare costs of ination, a commitment to highly persistent interest-rate changes is optimal. All simulations are characterized by very low (compared to historical standards) interest rate variability. The low variability is again attributable to the high degree of interest rate inertia under all the simulated rules, and the fact that in our rational expectations model this degree of inertia is both anticipated by agents and credible. Furthermore, comparison of the values presented in the second to last line of Table 2 shows that the steady-state ination rate induced by the interest-rate variability (as discussed in section 3.1) is very small, indicating that the welfare gains from further stabilization that could be achieved by a more variable interest-rate policy are too small to warrant the concomitant increase in . Signicant dierences in economic performance under the various interest-rate rules appear in the comparisons of the variances of ination, output, and the output gap. First, the variance of ination under all the simulated rules is only a small fraction of its historical value. This reects the large weight given to ination stabilization under all the objectives, which is furthermore perfectly understood by agents. The variance of output is much larger under any of the simulated rules than under the historical one, while the same is not true for the output gap. Whereas in the model the only rationale for output stabilization is stabilization of output around its ecient level, such behaviour does not seem to characterize historical policy. This raises the question whether the highly variable process of estimated disturbances to the ecient level of outputŶ e resembles those disturbances that in the mind of policymakers were not to be accomodated by policy.
Among the various simulated rules reported in Table 2 , the one minimizing expected ination 5 to 8 quarters ahead comes closest in terms of welfare to the one that is optimal under the objective (37). Minimizing the variance of expected ination 1 to 4 or 9 to 12 quarters ahead generates only marginally higher welfare losses. By contrast, minimizing the unconditional variance or, more severely, the variance of expected ination at the horizon 13 to 16 quarters ahead leads to considerably higher welfare losses. The main reason for these results is the interaction between the variances of wage and price ination. While the unconditional variances of price ination as well as the output gap increase almost monotonically with the horizon, by moving from horizon 1 to horizon 5 to 8 the unconditional variance of wage ination is reduced suciently to more than oset the welfare loss from the increase in price and output gap variance. The results thus suggest a tradeo between the variability of wage ination and price ination. The variances obtained under the rule that minimizes (37) also suggest that a slight increase in the variance of price ination is necessary to achieve a substantial reduction in the variability of wage ination.
The rst four columns in Table 3 report results for the case in which the coecient 1 is set to c 1 , the weight on the output gap term in the welfare objective (37), and 2 = 0. Compared to the results presented in Table 2 , the variance of wage ination is higher for the shortest horizon, the case in which just the unconditional variances enter the objective (40), but lower for the remaining three horizons. Exactly the opposite is true for price ination and, interestingly, the output gap, the variances of which are lower at horizon 1 when the output gap term is included in (40), but higher at the remaining horizons. Hence, charging the central bank with output gap stabilization seems to have the desired eect only if the central bank is charged with minimizing the variability of all uctuations, and not just forecastable ones, in the goal variables. In terms of welfare, the conicting changes in the variances of the various goal variables as the horizon changes lead to the lowest welfare loss for horizon 1 to 4, but aords only a slight reduction in welfare losses compared to the case without output gap stabilization entering (40). Increasing 1 to values larger than c 1 leads initially to marginal improvements in welfare, but already at a value 1 = 0:1 welfare is reduced compared to 1 = 0. The last four columns in Table 3 consider the case in which 1 = 0 and 2 is set equal to the coecient c 2 in (37). In this case, stabilization of all uctuations in wage and price ination leads to a sizeable reduction in the variance of wage ination, as one might expect, compared to the case of 2 = 0, while the variances of price ination and the output gap increase moderately. Of all the rules considered in Tables 2 and 3 , this one is the closest approximation to the welfare-optimal rule displayed in Table 2 . By contrast, stabilizing only those uctuations in price and wage ination which are forecastable more than four quarters ahead leads to much higher variances of the output gap and price and wage ination compared to the case of 2 = 0. Somewhat paradoxically, while stabilizing only expected price ination at a horizon of 5 to 8 quarters helped reduce the unconditional variance of wage ination, stabilizing both expected price and wage ination at the same horizon leads to a sharp increase in the unconditional variances of both. 4 Conclusions
The goal of this study is to establish which structural features of the economy might suggest the use of forecasts in the process of setting interest rates. To evaluate the welfare consequences of delegating certain forecast-based objectives to the central bank, we specify a small structural model with staggered wage and price setting, and use the representative household's welfare as the measure for evaluation. Our two ndings are, rst, if an objective dened only in terms of price ination variability is delegated to the central bank, then indeed stipulating that only the uctuations forecastable 5 to 8 quarters ahead should be stabilized is welfare-improving. Second, however, if the objective delegated to the central bank may be specied over the variability of more than one goal variable, the best alternative to delegating the welfare objective (37) directly is to delegate the minimization of the unconditional variances of both wage and price ination. In this case, stabilizing merely forecastable uctuations in these two variables leads to signicant welfare losses. is approximated byv 1 t +ŵ t 0 P T0t k=1 t+k . Finally, using the production function (6), the deviation of hours from steady state can be expressed asĤ t = 1 10a (Ŷ t 0 t ).
With this notation, the log-linear approximation of (22) can be written as 
